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In a decade that is witnessing a resurgence of law's devel-
opment and application to government entities around the 
world, in newly emerging democracies and in multi-national or-
ganizations like the European Union, the United States Su-
preme Court has moved away from the "political axiom" that 
the judicial power be co-extensive with the legislative. 1 In two 
recent cases the Court refused to uphold the jurisdiction of the 
lower federal courts to enforce federal law as against the states 
of the Union or their officers.2 It is a puzzling phenomenon. 
Perhaps it is explainable as merely an expected swing in the cy-
cle of more or less nationalist views of the judicial power de-
scribed by Richard Fallon,3 or perhaps it should be seen as part 
of a broader discomfort by a five justice majority with what it 
sees as an expanding and difficult-to-limit federal power.4 While 
the reasons may be obscure, the trend towards limitation of the 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I gratefully acknowl-
edge helpful comments from Sue Bloch, Mark Tushnet, and Carlos Vazquez on an ear-
lier draft. 
1. Federalist 80 (A. Hamilton) ("If there are such things as political axioms, the 
propriety of the judicial power of the government being coextensive with its legislative, 
may be ranked among the number."); Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 
Wheat.) 738, 816 (1824). 
2. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 117 S. Ct. 2028 (1997); Semincle Tribe of 
Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996). For a third possible invocation of the Eleventh 
Amendment to bar an injunction against a state officer to restrain an impending execu-
tion of a convicted murderer, see Breard v. Greene, 118 S. Ct. 1352, 1356 (1998) (noting 
Eleventh Amendment as additional ground for why Paraguay's suit to restrain execution 
of its national might not succeed). 
3. Richard Fallon, The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 Va. L. Rev. 1141 
(1988) (describing "Federalist" and "Nationalist" models of federal courts). 
4. The five justices who have supported restricting federal jurisdiction over actions 
against states and their officers also have insisted on limits on the substantive scope of 
Congress' powers vis-a-vis the states. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); 
Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997). 
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ability of the federal courts to hear federal claims against states 
and their officers is apparent. 
Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho,5 holding that a fed-
eral court lacked jurisdiction over a suit for equitable relief 
against state officers claimed to be interfering with tribal rights 
to lands under a river in Idaho, marks the second time in two 
Terms that the Court has found that the lower federal courts 
lack jurisdiction to decide claims based on federal law, simply 
because the defendants were state officials. Even for those 
without an interest in the underlying dispute, Coeur d'Alene 
would be worth at least a brief reflection in light of the case it 
follows. 
In 1996 the Court in Seminole Tribe v. Florida6 held that the 
Eleventh Amendment stood for a principle of constitutional 
immunity of states from suits in federal courts, prohibiting Con-
gress from authorizing private suits against states in federal 
courts to vindicate federal laws enacted pursuant to its Article I 
powers, such as the Commerce Clause, the Indian Commerce 
Clause, and, presumably, the Copyright and Bankruptcy Clauses 
as well. In so holding, the Court reversed the contrary conclu-
sion it had reached only eight years earlier in Union Gas v. 
Pennsylvania.7 The Union Gas holding that Congress did have 
power to authorize suits against states in federal courts was fore-
shadowed in the 1964 decision in Parden v. Terminal Railway.8 
Union Gas, however, was overruled by Seminole Tribe. 
In the more than thirty years between Parden and Seminole 
Tribe, Congress extended a variety of federal statutes to the 
states, including minimum wage laws, anti-discrimination laws, 
environmental laws, bankruptcy, and copyright laws.9 Many of 
these statutes included remedial and jurisdictional provisions 
that, read in the ordinary way, would appear to have authorized 
suits against states in federal courts. Once the Court began, in 
the 1970s, to require an unusually clear statement of intent to 
subject states to suits in federal courts,10 Congress responded by 
5. 117 S. Ct. 2028 (1997). 
6. 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996). 
7. 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989). 
8. 377 u.s. 184 (1964). 
9. See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §203(d) (extended to states in 1966); 
Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), (k) (extended in 1972); 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(20), 
(21), 9607(a) (Superfund amendments of 1986); 11 U.S.C. § 106 (bankruptcy code's lim-
ited abrogation of government immunity 1978, with further amendments, 1994); 17 
U.S.C. § 511 (copyright laws extended explicitly to abrogate states' immunity, 1990). 
10. See, e.g., Employees v. Department of Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 285-87 
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specifically authorizing suits against states notwithstanding their 
Eleventh Amendment immunity.11 
Why did this occur? No doubt a complex set of reasons are 
involved, among them, perhaps, these. First, state governments 
over the last 30 years have expanded the size and scope of their 
operations, in ways often lost in political rhetoric about the ex-
pansion of the federal government.12 As states participated in a 
broader array of activities, in areas in which private activity was 
legitimately subject to federal regulation, the distortions to fed-
eral policy from exempting states from regulation began to seem 
higher.13 Second, in part as a result of the reinvigoration of the 
(1973) (holding that Fair Labor Standards Act minimum wage law's substantive provi-
sions, though substantively applicable to state employees, could not be enforced in fed-
eral court against states through remedial and jurisdictional provisions generally author-
izing private suit because Congress had not spoken clearly enough to authorize such suits 
against states in federal courts). 
11. See, e.g., Pub. L. 93-259, §26, 88 Stat. 73 (1974) (amending 29 U.S.C. § 216 in 
response to Court's decision in Employees v. Depanment of Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 
279); Pub L. 99-506, § 1003, 100 Stat. 1807, 1845 (1986) (Rehabilitation Act amendments 
abrogating immunity in response to Court's decision in Atascadero State Hasp. v. Scan-
lon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985)). 
12. Governmental growth rates can be crudely measured by looking at numbers of 
employees. In 1972 state governments (not including local governments) employed 2.957 
million persons; in 1992 they employed 4.595 million. The Council of State Govern-
ments, 30 Book of the States at 439 (1994-95). The federal government employed 2.882 
million civilians in 1972, and 3.106 million in 1992. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Statistical 
Abstract of the United States 349 tbl. 537 (1997). In absolute numbers, and in rate of 
growth, then, state governments in the last 25 years have exceeded that of the federal 
government. According to the 1997 Statistical Abstract, state and local government em-
ployment wholly dwarfs the federal work force: 16.626 million persons were employed by 
state and local governments in 1995, while the federal government employed 2.895 mil-
lion civilian employees. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Statistical Abstract 321 tbls. 506, 507 
(1997). Projections for the year 2005 are for over 18 million state and local government 
employees compared with 2.635 million federal civilian employees. 1997 Statistical Ab-
stract at 416 tbl. 650. See also Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the 
Unshackling of the States, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 483 (1997) (arguing that Court's New Deal 
decisions freed both levels of government, state and federal, to engage in greater levels of 
regulation than under prior doctrine). 
13. So, for example, the expansion of higher education in state as well as private 
universities in the post World War II period, see U.S. Department of Education National 
Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics 1996 at 11 tbl. 2, 175 tbl. 
168 (1996), has created greater opportunities for state-controlled entities to engage in 
activities which, like those of their private counterparts, could interfere with areas of fed-
eral regulation, e.g., the copyright interests of authors. See, e.g., Copyright Remedy 
Clarification Act and Copyright Office Report on Copyright Liability of States, Hearings 
on H.R. 1131 before the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Admini-
stration of Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary, IOlst Cong., 1st Sess. 6-9 
(1989) ("Hearings") (statement of Ralph Oman, Registrar of Copyrights) (testifying to 
substantial concern about unauthorized copying by state agencies, including universities, 
and their possible unwillingness to provide for payment of royalties absent federal judi-
cial enforcement of statutory damages provisions). It is not my suggestion that all exten-
sions of federal law to the activities of the states can be explained in this way, but that, 
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Fourteenth Amendment as a constraint on state activities,14 the 
notion that states had distinctive claims of immunity from fed-
eral law and federal process had less and less political resonance, 
when put up against claims in the national legislature for equal-
ity of treatment by the states-for those employed by or in con-
tact with the states as compared to their private counterparts. 
Third, as we have gone through waves of regulation and de-
regulation, of government-initiated ventures to privatization, the 
collective political sense of what activities "belong" to the "pri-
vate'' and what to the "public" realm has begun to dissipate, just 
as for some scholars the distinction (on which, for example, the 
state action doctrine is founded) has become insupportable. 15 
Whatever the reasons, by 1996 a wide range of regulatory 
laws had been extended in substance to state activities, and the 
remedies available in federal courts to vindicate those federal 
policies had also been extended to the states. The Court's deci-
sion in Seminole Tribe- holding that Congress lacked power to 
provide federal court remedies against states for federal laws en-
acted under Article 1-was thus an important, and disruptive, 
reversal in the law. Under Seminole Tribe, restrictions on fed-
eral judicial power presently appear to exceed those imposed on 
federal legislative power.16 And Seminole Tribe's substantial, 
among other factors, this one has some explanatory potential. 
14. In the post-New Deal period, the Amendment emerged as both a shield and a 
sword for protecting widely held individual civil and political rights. See e.g., Monroe v. 
Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (construing section 1983 more broadly to authorize suits for 
damages against state and local government employees for violation of Fourth Amend-
ment rights incorporated against state by 14th amendment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 
(1961); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (procedural due process requirements for 
termination of state welfare benefits). This is in contrast to earlier phases of its invoca-
tion to protect business interests and property rights. See e.g. Lochner v. New York, 198 
U.S. 45 (1903); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los 
Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913). Note that the Term that the Court for the first time relied 
on the.Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause to strike down a state economic law, 
Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890), was the 
same Term in which the Court extended the Eleventh Amendment to protect states from 
private suits brought by their own citizens, Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
15. See, e.g., Geoffrey Stone, et al., Constitutional Law 1711 (Little, Brown and 
Company, 3d ed. 1996) (questioning whether state action is not always present, either by 
way of action or acquiescence). 
16. The apparent anomaly of construing the judicial power not to extend to cases to 
enforce particular federal laws against state officials, nominally on Eleventh Amendment 
grounds, may be explained in part by a shift in paradigm about the substantive scope of 
congressional power. In both of the recent Eleventh Amendment cases referred to in 
text there were significant questions about whether the substantive obligations over 
which jurisdiction was asserted were themselves within federal power. See Seminole 
Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1126 n.10 (noting but not deciding Tenth Amendment challenge to 
federal law insofar as it was construed to require Governor to engage in negotiations or 
to require state to conclude a compact); Brief for Petitioner, Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene 
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and complicated, implications are being worked out in the lower 
federal courts. 
First, Seminole Tribe appears to reaffirm the constitutional-
ity of Congress' "abrogating" state immunity pursuant to Section 
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, on the basis of which, for ex-
ample, the extension of Title VII remedies to the states had been 
upheld in 1974.17 The lower courts are thus struggling with a set 
of questions calling into stark relief the contrasting powers of 
Congress under Article I, simpliciter, and under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.18 
Particularly in light of Boerne v. Flores/9 which invalidated 
the Federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) as be-
yond Congress' authority, there are many federal statutes-ar-
guably supported by Congress' section 5 powers-whose validity 
is in doubt insofar as they authorize federal jurisdiction over 
states. Can either the patent or copyright laws' abrogation of 
state immunity be saved (or reconstructed) by regarding the in-
Tribe of Idaho, 117 S. Ct. 2028 (1997) (No. 94-1474) (available in 1996 WL 290997). 
(State argued, on merits, that President lacked authority by executive order in 1873 to 
derogate from strong presumption of equality of sovereignty under which all states, in-
cluding Idaho in 1890, enter Union). In other words, Seminole Tribe may be simply an 
"advance guard" for an even broader set of restrictions on federal legislative power to 
impose substantive regulation on the states. 
If there is a paradigm shift that accounts for these developments, there is not a per-
fect parallelism in their current development: Printz v. United States, for example, left 
open the question whether Congress can require states to comply with such generally 
applicable laws, enacted under Article I, as the Fair Labor Standards Act minimum wage 
laws. See 117 S. Ct. at 2383. Several lower courts have concluded after Seminole Tribe, 
however, that federal courts cannot exercise jurisdiction to enforce those provisions, sug-
gesting that they are enforceable only in state courts. See, e.g., Aaron v. Kansas, 115 F.3d 
813, 817 (lOth Cir. 1997); Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203, 211 (6th Cir. 1996); see 
also Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 139 F.3d 504 (5th Cir. 1998) (suggesting that Congress 
could authorize copyright suits against states in state courts). 
17. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). 
18. In bankruptcy, compare, e.g., In re Straight, 1997 U.S. DIST. LEXIS 7400 (D. 
Wyo. May 15, 1997) (accepting U.S. government argument that Congress validly abro-
gated states immunities in bankruptcy based in part on privileges and immunities clause) 
with Schlossberg v. Maryland, 119 F.3d 1140, 1146-47 (4th Cir. 1997) (rejecting argu-
ment). For an emerging distinction between the minimum wage law and the Equal Pay 
Act provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, compare, e.g .. Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 
99 F.3d 203 (6th Cir. 1996) (Congress lacked power to abrogate state's immunity to suit 
on alleged violations of minimum wage provisions, in light of absence of connection be-
tween those provisions and concerns of 14th amendment) with Timmer v. Michigan Dept 
of Commerce, 104 F.3d 833 (6th Cir. 1997) (Equal Pay Act provisions of FLSA, and ab-
rogation of immunity thereunder, can be upheld as permissible exercise of Congress's 
Fourteenth Amendment powers). Cf. Abril v. Virginia, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 10281 
(4th Cir. 1998) (majority concludes FLSA does not constitutionally abrogate state's im-
munity from federal court suit over a dissent arguing that FLSA's abrogation can be sus-
tained under the 14th amendment). 
19. 117 s. Ct. 2157 (1997). 
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terests created by those statutes as a form of "property" pro-
tected by the Due Process clause, and if so, can Congress, under 
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, make available to 
those injured by state infringements the same federal judicial 
remedies available to victims of private violations?20 Or consider 
another kind of problem: the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act's extension to the states was upheld as an exercise of 
the federal Commerce Power.21 If the Commerce Clause is the 
only constitutional basis for the legislation, however, under 
Seminole Tribe the states cannot be sued in federal courts on this 
statute. Can the statute be justified as an exercise of Congress' 
section 5 powers? 
While reasonable arguments would support this contention, 
there is a reasonable counter-argument. In Massachusetts Board 
of Retirement v. Murgia,22 the Court had held that discrimination, 
by a state, based on age in retirement requirements did not vio-
late the Equal Protection clause. Boerne v. Flores,23 which held 
20. The patent statute's abrogation of state sovereign immunity explicitly invoked 
the Fourteenth Amendment. See 35 U.S.C. 271(h), 296 (1994). Some lower federal 
courts have suggested that where an action is brought against a state by a patent holder 
for infringement of the holder's interest in the patent, abrogation in these circumstances 
would be valid under the Fourteenth Amendment and permit the suit against the state in 
federal court. See College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense 
Bd., 948 F. Supp. 400, 422-26 (D.N.J.) (holding that patent statute validly abrogated 
Eleventh Amendment immunity under Fourteenth Amendment but dismissing Lanham 
Act claims), affd as to Lanham Act dismissal, 131 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 1997) and affd as to 
Eleventh Amendment abrogation on patent claims, No. 97-1246, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 
14903 (Fed. Cir. June 30, 1998); Genentech Inc. v. Regents of University of California, 939 
F. Supp. 639, 643-44 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (dictum in case holding that Eleventh Amendment 
barred action for declaratory judgment against the state when the state holds the patent), 
rev'd on other grounds, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 8812 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding state waiver 
of Eleventh Amendment immunity). The Copyright Act's abrogation of immunity did 
not explicitly refer to the Fourteenth Amendment. See 17 U.S.C. § 511 (1994). If patent 
rights can be treated as a form of property, which Congress can protect from deprivations 
without due process of Jaw, a similar rationale could presumably be extended to the 
Copyright Act, at least if Congress so indicated. Unanswered questions include (I) 
whether Congress has some obligation to make clear its intent to invoke the Fourteenth 
Amendment as a basis for action; (2) if so, how it must do so; (3) the degree to which 
federal law will be conceived of as creating "property" interests for purposes of the Four-
teenth Amendment's due process clause; and (4) whether for these purposes a state's 
provision of remedies in its own courts would satisfy "due process" requirements and 
preclude Congress from conferring jurisdiction in federal courts on that basis. For dis-
cussion, see Carlos Vazquez, What is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 Yale LJ. 
1683, 1745-63 & n.331 (1997); see also Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 139 F.3d 504 (5th 
Cir. 1998) (holding copyright and Lanham Act abrogations unconstitutional, finding 
Fourteenth Amendment rationale to go too far in permitting "end run" around Seminole 
Tribe). 
21. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983). 
22. 427 U.S. 307,312-14 (1976) (applying rational basis review). 
23. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997) 
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unconstitutional the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, em-
phasized that Congress lacks power, under section 5, to define as 
a constitutional violation something which the Court has said is 
not. And an assertion that Congress is seeking merely to remedy 
discrimination that the Court would find prohibited must now be 
supported by a showing that the remedy is proportional to the 
identifiable scope of the constitutional violation.24 How this 
standard will apply to the ADEA, or other comparable statues,25 
is not clear.26 
In light of the substantial roadblocks to judicial enforcement 
of federal law created by Seminole Tribe's first holding, the so-
called "Ex parte Young" doctrine assumes greater importance in 
the constitutional scheme. Under the doctrine of Ex parte 
Young,21 a suit for prospective relief, against a state officer, to 
enjoin future violations of federal law, is treated as not a suit 
24. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2164. 
25. See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12101 et seq. (1994); Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EAHCA), 
codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1994). After Boerne, the concern whether 
these laws could be upheld under the Fourteenth Amendment arises from the Court's 
holdings that there is no fundamental right to education, San Antonio Ind. Schl. Dist. v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), and that persons with certain disabilities are not a suspect 
class, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985). Thus, state 
laws in these areas would ordinarily be evaluated for equal protection purposes under 
rational basis scrutiny, and the Court would be unlikely to hold that, absent federal leg-
islation, states have judicially enforceable duties under the Fourteenth Amendment, e.g., 
to provide special accommodations for such persons. But Boerne also recognized leeway 
in Congress to enforce Fourteenth Amendment rights, and indicated that whether a pur-
ported enforcement scheme will be upheld rests in part on the degree to which the rem-
edy is proportional to the existence of injuries to constitutional rights that the Court 
would recognize as such. Because the Court, in Cleburne and in Romer v. Evans, 116 S. 
Ct. 1620 (1996), has held that irrational fear or prejudice cannot support a state legisla-
tive classification even under rational basis analysis, statutes like the ADA or EAHCA 
might be sustainable on the argument that Congress could have found that irrational 
fears or prejudice motivated many exclusions or failures to provide accommodations for 
the disabled. 
26. The question whether the substantive law can be upheld as an exercise of Four-
teenth Amendment power is important not only for Eleventh Amendment purposes, but 
for purposes of the rule of Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997), that Congress 
cannot "commandeer" or impose mandatory federal statutory duties on state or local 
governments or their officials. Printz, whose reasoning turns on a view that the original 
Constitution of 1787 abandoned federal power to act directly on the states, leaves open 
the possibility that direct commands to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment are 
permissible. To the extent that statutory requirements under statutes like the ADA or 
ADEA are conceived of as involving affirmative commands to executive or legislative 
officials, rather than negative restraints or commands addressed to state courts, Printz's 
rule might come into play but could be nonetheless avoided if the statutes were author-
ized under the Fourteenth Amendment. For further discussion, see Vicki C. Jackson, 
Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 2180 
(1998). 
27. 209 u.s. 123 (1908). 
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against the state. For many years this principle had been applied 
in a way to prohibit suits for "retroactive" or compensatory re-
lief that would come from state coffers, but generally to permit 
prospective injunctive relief to enforce federallaw.28 This was a 
rough constitutional modus operandi that, as recently as 1984, 
the Court justified as necessary to vindicate the supremacy of 
federallaw. 29 
But Seminole Tribe had a further holding, whose signifi-
cance I will explore in the next section of this essay. For the first 
time since Ex parte Young itself, the Court in Seminole Tribe 
held that the Eleventh Amendment barred purely prospective 
injunctive relief (not involving property of the state or accrued 
financial liabilities), against a state official (there, the Governor 
of Florida), to compel his future compliance with federal law 
(the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act [IGRA], which, plaintiffs 
argued, required the Governor to negotiate in good faith with 
the tribe over proposed gambling on tribal lands). This portion 
of the opinion was quite brief, however, and while the Court did 
say it found an Eleventh Amendment violation,30 its reasoning 
seemed more to suggest that the difficulty was that Congress-in 
the statutory enforcement scheme itself- had intended to pre-
clude suits against individual state officers.31 While this was, as 
David Currie (among others) suggests, an implausible reading of 
the statute,32 it certainly left room for the possibility that the dis-
cussion of Ex parte Young was of minimal precedential value. 
28. See, e.g. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). While damage actions against 
officers in their individual capacities are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, see 
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237-38 (1974), qualified immunity doctrines substan-
tially limit the practical availability of this remedy in many cases. For this reason, many 
authorities have described the Ex parte Young rule, and the availability of prospective 
relief to enforce federal law and prevent ongoing violations of federal law, as founda-
tional to the supremacy of federal law and essential to the rule of law. See, e.g., Seminole 
Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1180 (Souter, J., dissenting); Charles Alan Wright, Law 
of Federal Courts 292 (West Publishing Co., 4th ed. 1983); Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal 
Jurisdiction, 393 (little, Brown and Co., 2d ed. 1994); Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe, 
the Eleventh Amendment, and the Potential Evisceration of Ex Parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 495,512,539-41 (1997). 
29. Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984). 
30. See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1133 (suit against Governor under IGRA vio-
lates the Eleventh Amendment). 
31. See id. at 1131-32. 
32. David P. Currie, Ex parte Young after Seminole Tribe, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 547, 
550 (1997); see Jackson, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 517-19 (cited in note 28). 
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I. EX PARTE YOUNG AND COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE 
Soon after Seminole Tribe was decided, the Court agreed to 
decide another case involving the availability of "Ex parte 
Young" relief against state officers, perhaps signalling its inten-
tion to rework this area.33 The Coeur d'Alene tribe of Idaho had 
sued the state and its officials in federal court, asserting that cer-
tain submerged lands under the Coeur d'Alene River belong to 
the Tribe, not the state, by virtue of executive orders entered in 
the 1870s. The trial court had dismissed the claims against the 
state itself as barred by the Eleventh Amendment, as well as the 
quiet title action and request for declaratory relief against the 
state officers, and had rejected on the merits the Tribe's claims 
against the officers for injunctive relief.34 
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the lower court that the 
Tribe's quiet title action (against both the state and its officers) 
was barred by the Eleventh Amendment, because a quiet title 
action necessarily determines ownershig interests and thus 
would impair the state's claimed interest. However, the Ninth 
Circuit held, the Tribe's request for declaratory and injunctive 
relief against state officials to prevent interference with the 
Tribe's alleged property rights in certain submerged lands, de-
rived from federal law, could proceed under Ex parte Young.36 
Because it concluded that the Tribe might be able to prove facts 
entitling it to relief, the Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of 
the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against the state 
officials and remanded. 
Following the approach adopted on remand in Florida Dept. 
of State v. Treasure Salvors,37 the Ninth Circuit indicated that, if 
the Coeur d'Alene Tribe prevailed on its ownership claims, the 
relief against state officers would not bind the State (or its agen-
cies),38 which would evidently allow the State to bring its own 
33. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 116 S. Ct. 1415 (1996), granting cer-
tiorari in Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho v. Idaho, 42 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1994). My thanks 
to my colleague Richard Lazarus for suggesting this point. 
34. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho v. Idaho, 798 F. Supp. 1443 (D. Idaho 1992). Id. at 
1449-52 (reaching merits and deciding in favor of state's claim to title, and therefore dis-
missing the prayer for an "injunction against the individual defendants, to prevent them 
from regulating or taking any action contrary to the Tribe's claimed right of exclusive use 
and possession of the disputed lands and waters.") 
35. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho v. Idaho, 42 F.3d at 1248-50. 
36. Id. at 1251-55. 
37. 458 u.s. 670 (1982). 
38. 42 F.3d at 1255 (citing Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 689 F.2d 
1254,1256) (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam). 
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quiet title action against the tribe. The Court of Appeals recog-
nized that by its ruling, neither the Tribe nor the State would 
have clear title through the federal judgment, but explained the 
distinction it drew as a necessary compromise between the Elev-
enth Amendment immunity of the State and the need to prevent 
future violations of federal law by state officials.39 
A. THE REASONING OF THE MAJORITY 
By the same 5-4 vote as in Seminole Tribe, the Supreme 
Court reversed, holding that the Ex parte Young doctrine did not 
permit federal courts to entertain the action against the state of-
ficials.'10 Justice Kennedy, for the Court, wrote that the Tribe 
had alleged an ongoing violation of federally-protected rights 
and sought prospective injunctive relief, which "is ordinarily suf-
ficient to invoke the Young fiction."41 However, the Court con-
cluded, this case was unusual in that it was the "functional 
equivalent of a ~uiet title action which implicates special sover-
eignty interests." 2 First, if relief were granted, "substantially all 
benefits of ownership and control would shift from the State to 
the Tribe. "43 Second, such a determination would be "in effect, a 
determination that the lands in question are not even within the 
regulatory jurisdiction of the State," and would "diminish, even 
extinguish, the State's control over a vast reach of lands and wa-
ters long deemed by the State to be an integral part of its terri-
tory."44 In light of these "particular and special circumstances," 
the majority agreed that the Young exception was inapplicable.45 
The application of sovereign immunity notions to real prop-
erty disputes has been an area of notorious difficulty in drawing 
39. Id. at 1253-54 (referring to the "middle ground between the necessarily con-
flicting doctrines of state sovereign immunity and the supremacy of federal law"). 
40. Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion for the Court, in all of which Chief Justice 
Rehnquist joined and in portions of which Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas joined. 
See Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2031 (1997). Justice O'Connor wrote a separate concur-
rence, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas. Id. at 2043. Justice Souter wrote a dissent 
in which Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined. ld. at 2047. 
41. ld. at 2040. 
42. !d. 
43. Id.; see id. at 2043 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (suit is functional equivalent to action to quiet title, since Tribe asks federal 
court "to declare that the lands are for the exclusive use, occupancy and enjoyment of the 
Tribe and to invalidate all statutes and ordinances purporting to regulate the lands."). 
44. ld. at 2040; id. at 2044 (O'Connor J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (Tribe does not seek merely to possess lands that would otherwise be subject 
to state regulation, or to bring state regulatory scheme into compliance with federal law, 
but to eliminate state regulatory power over the lands). 
45. Id. at 2043. 
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principled distinctions. But these conclusions of the Coeur 
d'Alene Court were by no means foregone. Earlier cases had 
permitted adjudication of claims against state officers for pro-
spective relief to vindicate alleged private interests in property 
purportedly owned by the state, notwithstanding the functional 
similarity between prospective relief against state officers and a 
judgment in a quiet title action.46 
46. See, e.g., Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.S. 204 (1897); Florida Dept. of State v. Treas-
ure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670 (1982) (Stevens, J., for the plurality); see also United States 
v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882) (upholding jurisdiction over suit in ejectment against two U.S. 
army officers to recover possession of property taken from the Lee estate by U.S., and 
rejecting argument that suit against the officers was prohibited by the sovereign immu-
nity of the United States). Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court, following the more 
limited reading of these decisions suggested by Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 465 
U.S. 89, 104-05 (1984), distinguished Treasure Salvors by asserting that the claim of the 
state to the property in Treasure Salvors was not colorable and thus its officers were act-
ing beyond their authority under state law. Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2040. This dis-
tinction seems weak, since one reason the state officials lacked authority in Treasure Sal-
vors was that another recent decision, United States v. Florida, 420 U.S. 531 (1976) (per 
curiam) had held that the area of the ocean in which the salvaged property was found did 
not belong to Florida but to the United States; in Coeur d'Alene the Tribe was seeking to 
obtain an adjudication of who the land in question belonged to. Indeed, the majority de-
cision in Coeur d'Alene appears far more compatible with the views expressed by Justice 
White, dissenting on this point in Treasure Salvors, that "a colorable basis for the exer-
cise of authority by state officials may not ultimately be a valid one, but it does serve to 
invoke the Eleventh Amendment," Treasure Salvors, 458 U.S. at 716, at least in claims 
involving rights to property related to government contracts and controlled by the rule of 
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949). Justice O'Connor's 
concurring opinion distinguished Lee and Tindal because, she argued, they did not in-
volve a claim that a state could not exercise regulatory jurisdiction. Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. 
Ct. at 2044. It is true that the plaintiff in Lee was a private citizen, and not an Indian 
tribe, and therefore his claim to the property did not bring with it the possibilities for 
regulatory jurisdiction of Indian tribes as plaintiffs. See text accompanying notes 51-52 
(discussing relationship between fact that tribe was plaintiff and consequences, under 
federal law, for state regulatory authority). But because the lands in question in Lee were 
then being held by the federal government, recognition of the Lee claim of private own-
ership would indeed have substantial consequences for the regulatory jurisdiction of the 
government in possession: the federal government has power to exercise legislative juris-
diction over areas within states owned by it, especially for military purposes, see Art. I, 
§8 [12]-(14], (17], while if the property were privately owned, legislative jurisdiction (over 
real property laws, zoning etc.) would fall to the state (not the federal) government. The 
distinction proposed by Justice O'Connor, then, is illusory, and particularly so in light of 
the rationale of the Lee case itself, which rested on the (I) lack of justification for sover-
eign immunity, (2) the fact that it was army officers, and not the U.S. government, who 
were named as defendants, and the traditions of sovereign immunity law permitting suits 
against officers and (3) the fact that the judgment would not be binding on the U.S., but 
only its officers-as the Ninth Circuit proposed in this case. The dissent, by contrast, ar-
gued that "an officer suit implicating title is no more or less the 'functional equivalent' of 
an action against the government than any other Young suit," id. at 2053 (Souter, J., dis-
senting), and agreed with the Ninth Circuit, see note 39, that permitting relief against the 
officers without precluding the state's claim of title should it choose to bring a quiet title 
action was a "fair via media between the extremes." I d. 
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Justice Kennedy invoked existing distinctions in Eleventh 
Amendment doctrine between prospective and retrospective re-
lief, arguing that the relief sought by Tribe would be "fully as in-
trusive as almost any conceivable retroactive levy upon funds in 
its Treasury."47 However, as the dissent pointed out, purely pro-
spective relief-like that granted in Ex parte Young itself-is of-
ten very intrusive.48 Thus, intrusiveness does not serve to distin-
guish among permissible forms of relief. 
To the extent that the state's sovereign interests in regulat-
ing submerged lands in the future were understood to make the 
relief more intrusive and hence, in the eyes of the majority, more 
like prohibited "retroactive" relief than permitted "prospective" 
relief, the reasoning would expand the scope of what is deemed 
prohibited "retroactive" relief in suits against state officers. The 
distinction between prospective and retroactive relief has itself 
been difficult to define in some circumstances,49 and the opinion 
thus can be read to suggest that some future regulatory actions 
might nonetheless fall on the "retroactive" side of the balance.50 
The decision thereby diminishes the arena of accountability un-
der federal law and expands the domain of immunity, by limiting 
the officer suit beyond prior doctrine. 
47. See Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2043 (if Tribe were to win, Idaho's interests 
"would be affected in a degree fully as intrusive as almost any conceivable retroactive 
levy upon funds in its Treasury"). 
48. Id. at 2050-51, 2055 (Souter, 1., dissenting) (tribe seeks no damages or restitu-
tion, nor rescission of past transactions, but only to restrain future violations of law, a 
form of relief that is plainly prospective; majority wrong to equate "intrusiveness" with 
retroactivity since prospective relief can be very intrusive). 
49. As an illustration that the dividing line between retroactive and prospective re-
lief has not always been easy to draw, see Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 295 (1977) 
(upholding as prospective relief an order that the state pay half the costs of a local school 
system in improving schools to secure compliance with desegregation orders). But at 
least where no payments arising from past wrongful conduct were sought, and where 
there were ongoing violations of federal law, prospective injunctive relief has generally 
been available. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974) (Ex parte Young per-
mits prospective but not retroactive relief against public official, and thus bars restitution 
of past due welfare benefits); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 279-82 (1986) (claim for 
future payments based on past breach of trust is barred as involving essentially retroac-
tive relief, while claim based on ongoing alleged violations of the equal protection clause 
could be adjudicated). 
50. As noted below, however, the opinion may be circumscribed, or circumscrib-
able, by the particular aspects of tribal claims to submerged lands, which, because of the 
special status of submerged lands and features of federal Indian law, may involve greater 
potential limitation of the state's exercise of regulatory powers than other property ~s­
putes do. But see California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 118 S. 0. 1464, 1472 (1998) (Im-
plying, albeit in dicta, that Coeur d'Alene reflects rule that "the Eleventh Amendment 
bars federal jurisdiction over general title disputes relating to State property interests"). 
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Moreover, the Court's conclusion that the relief sought had 
consequences "well beyond the typical stakes in a real property 
quiet title action," because the Tribe's claim, if sustained, would 
mean "that the lands in question were not even within the regu-
latory jurisdiction of the State,"51 is in some sense simply a con-
sequence of the constitutional scope of the national govern-
ment's power over tribes and their lands.52 It is not an obvious 
reason to prefer the exercise of state, rather than federal, judicial 
power. 53 
Yet in these respects the opinions seem to be quite specifi-
cally rooted in the context of tribal claims to submerged lands 
having "unique status in the law,"54 and perhaps to have more 
limited implications for other claims. Whether what was crucial 
was that the claims to real property were asserted by a tribe 
(with the ensuing loss of sovereign regulatory authority for the 
state resulting from the unique status of "Indian Tribes" under 
federal law), or that the real property in question was submerged 
land under a riverbed (with their unique associations with state 
sovereignty and interstate equality under the equal footing doc-
trine), or the conjunction of these factors, cannot clearly be dis-
cerned from the Court's opinion. One might fairly conclude 
from the Coeur d'Alene opinions, however, that some or all of 
these factors together constituted the circumstance that make 
the case so "particular and special." 55 
51. Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2040. In describing the special effects on state sov-
ereignty from the relief sought here, Kennedy's opinion for the Court also emphasized 
the state's uniquely sovereign interests in ownership of and sovereignty over submerged 
lands. Id. at 1041-43 (discussing how state ownership of submerged lands has historically 
been considered an essential attribute of sovereignty and protected by the "equal foot-
ing" doctrine). The opinion may be read to suggest that because state ownership of sub-
merged lands is ordinarily protected by the "equal footing" doctrine, it is more closely 
related to the state's status as sovereign, than if the property in question were something 
other than submerged lands. 
52. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 557 (1981) (tribe had exclusive 
jurisdiction to regulate hunting and fishing on tribal lands); cf. California v. Cabazon 
Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 221-22 (1987) (state law could not be applied to 
prohibit casino gambling on tribal lands). 
53. See Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2054 (Souter, 1 ., dissenting) (it is true but ir-
relevant to Young's application that state regulatory power is affected since this is always 
the case where Young is invoked) and text accompanying notes 58-63 (describing jus-
tices' views of relevance of state court forum in Idaho to availability of Ex pane Young 
relief in federal court). 
54. Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2041 (arguing that navigable waters "uniquely im-
plicate sovereign interests"). 
55. Id. at 2043. Even more recently, however, the Court has implicitly character-
ized Coeur d'Alene more broadly. See Deep Sea Research, Inc., 118 S. Ct. at 1472 ("[T]he 
Eleventh Amendment bars federal jurisdiction over general title disputes relating to 
State property interests.") This statement, however, was dicta, for the Court in that case 
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B. JUSTICE KENNEDY'S ADDITIONAL REASONING 
Other portions of Justice Kennedy's opinion, joined only by 
the Chief Justice, advocated more far-reaching changes in the Ex 
parte Young doctrine. Justice Kennedy urged that the availabil-
ity of prospective relief based on federal law against state offi-
cers should be decided on a case by case basis, based on (1) the 
availability of a state court forum, (2) the degree of intrusion on 
state interests posed by the subject matter of the case or form of 
relief sought and (3) the nature and importance of the federal 
right asserted by the plaintiff.56 
The balance Kennedy proposed would give substantial 
weight to the availability of a state court forum for resolution of 
the dispute as a reason for rejecting federal jurisdiction in suits 
for prospective relief against state officers,57 and to the interests 
and competence of the states in defining within their own courts 
the scope of state administrative law and function when federal 
law challenges arise.58 Thus, where a state provided a judicial 
remedy for adjudicating plaintiff's claim, according to Justice 
Kennedy, this would weigh against the availability of Ex parte 
Young as a basis for proceeding in federal court. Notwithstand-
ing Justice Kennedy's suggestion otherwise, this would be a rna-
rejected California's argument that the Eleventh Amendment precluded federal adjudi-
cation of interests in a shipwreck in an in rem admiralty proceeding where the State did 
not have possession of the res. ld. at 1472-73. While the case did not involve Ex parte 
Young issues (the State of California being a party in its own name), interestingly the 
majority opinion and two concurring opinions can be read to suggest a possible narrow-
ing of the application of Eleventh Amendment immunity in admiralty actions. See id. at 
1470-72 (noting early views of Justices Story and Washington that the Eleventh Amend-
ment did not apply in admiralty, and narrowly construing later cases holding that it did); 
id. at 1474 (Stevens, J., concurring) (disavowing his earlier opinion in Florida Dept. of 
State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670 (1982) and apparently agreeing with views of 
Justices Story and Washington); id. at 1474 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (joining the Court's 
opinion and noting that issue of whether state's possession or nonpossession is critical for 
Eleventh Amendment purposes in admiralty is "open to reconsideration" in light of 
"subsisting doubts" about Treasure Salvors and Justice Stevens' concurrence). 
56. Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2035-40 (Kennedy J., for himself and the Chief Jus-
tice). 
57. Id. at 2035-36 (Kennedy, J., for himself and the Chief Justice). 
58. Id. at 2036-38 (Kennedy, J., for himself and the Chief Justice). As Justice 
O'Connor notes, "[e]very Young suit names public officials," and states have "a con-
tinuing interest in" any litigation against its officials, and thus these characteristics on 
which Kennedy wants to rely "do not distinguish it from cases in which the Young doc-
trine is properly invoked." Id. at 2047 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment). O'Connor and Souter also criticized Justice Kennedy's downplaying of 
the importance of federal courts enforcing federal law, and his provocative comment that 
the states may not have consented to suits against officers based on federal law in agree-
ing to the Supremacy Oause. ld. at 2037 (Kennedy, J., for himself and the Chief Justice); 
id. at 2045-46 (O'Connor); id. at 2054-55 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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jor change in the Ex parte Young doctrine (and one which, in 
light of the existence of state court systems with remedies against 
state officers, could relegate federal courts to an insignificant 
supplementary role in actions against state officials). 
Kennedy's opinion goes on to acknowledge but then un-
dermine the idea that Ex parte Young serves "an important in-
terest" when a case "calls for the interpretation of federal law. "59 
"For purposes of the Supremacy Clause," Kennedy argued, it is 
irrelevant whether state or federal courts adjudicate federal law 
claims.60 Emphasizing that federal courts may play an "indispen-
sable role" in disputes between states, and suits brought by the 
United States, the "[i]nterpretation of federal law is the proprie-
tary concern of state, as well as federal, courts."61 To permit an 
Ex parte Young action simply because a federal legal issue is in-
volved would be too "expansive."62 Where (as is often the case 
in federal litigation against state officials) "the parties invoke 
federal principles to challenge state administrative action, the 
courts of the State have a strong interest in integrating those 
sources of law within their own system for the proper judicial 
control of state officials."63 When, then, would the balance favor 
allowing an Ex parte Young action? After implying that it might 
not do so in statutory actions,64 Kennedy referred to Milliken v. 
Bradley,65 which had upheld as prospective an injunction that 
state officials help pay for educational improvements in a school 
desegregation case, suggesting that it was less the nature of the 
relief, nor even the federal law nature of the claim, but rather 
the "substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment 
themselves [which] offer a powerful reason to provide a federal 
forum."66 
59. Id. at 2036 (Kennedy, J., for himself and the Chief Justice). 
60. ld. at 2037 (Kennedy, J., for himself and the Chief Justice). 
61. ld. at 2037 (Kennedy, J., for himself and the Chief Justice). While Kennedy was 
willing to "assume" that, apart from litigation between states or suits brought by the 
United States, the federal courts may have a "special role" in the interpretation and ap-
plication of federal law "in other instances" as well, id., his argument for state court par-
ity looks in the opposite direction. 
62. Id. at 2236-37 (Kennedy, J., for himself and the Chief Justice). 
63. ld. at 2037-38 (Kennedy, J., for himself and the Chief Justice). 
64. In discussing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) for example, Justice Ken-
nedy noted that "there was no need for the Edelman Court to consider the ... relief 
granted by the district court, prospectively enjoining state officials from failing to abide 
by federal requirements, since it was conceded that Young was sufficient for this pur-
pose." Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2038 (Kennedy, J., for himself and the Chief Justice). 
65. 433 U.S. 267,295 (1977). 
66. Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2039 (Kennedy, J., for himself and the Chief Jus-
tice). Query whether this might suggest that neither state officials, nor the states, could 
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Specifically invoking Seminole Tribe's citation of Schweiker 
v. Chilicky,61 Justice Kennedy went on to argue that Seminole 
Tribe's "implicit analogy of Young to Bivens is instructive [be-
cause both] Young and [the] Bivens lines of cases reflect a sensi-
tivity to varying contexts,"68 and thus courts should consider 
whether there are "special factors counselling hesitation,"69 be-
fore allowing either a Bivens suit or an Ex parte Young action to 
proceed. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents10 is the 
case establishing the existence of constitutional causes of action 
for damages against federal officials, whose scope has been lim-
ited in more recent decisions (such as Chilicky). The analogy to 
Bivens, drawn in Seminole Tribe and repeated by Justice Ken-
nedy in Coeur d'Alene, thus suggests that Ex parte Young relief 
in both constitutional and statutory causes might be limited. 
Justice O'Connor, however, in an opinion joined by Justices 
Scalia and Thomas, rejected Justice Kennedy's "case-specific 
analysis," as "unnecessarily recharacteriz[ing] and narrow[ing] 
much of our Young jurisprudence."71 Particularly critical of 
Kennedy's "casting doubt" on the importance of having federal 
courts interpret federal law, and of the "basic principle of federal 
law" that "[w]hen a plaintiff seeks prospective relief to end an 
ongoing violation of federal rights, ordinarily the Eleventh 
Amendment poses no bar,"72 O'Connor disputed that prior case 
law supports his view that availability of a state forum is relevant 
to whether Ex -parte Young permits prospective relief.73 Her 
be sued for (at least for "affirmative") relief under federal statutes enacted under Article 
I of the Constitution? This result would not be inconsistent with the spirit of Printz v. 
United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 ( 1997) (Congress lacks power under Article I to require 
state or local officials to administer federal laws). See note 16 (discussing possible para-
digm shift). 
67. 487 U.S. 412 (1988), cited in Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1132. For discussion, 
see Jackson, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 527-33 (cited in note 28). 
68. Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. a. at 2039 (Kennedy, J., for himself and the Chief Jus-
tice). 
69. Id. (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 396 
(1971)). 
70. 403 u.s. 388 (1971). 
71. Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. a. at 2045 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment). 
72. ld. at 2046, 2045 (O'Connor, J. concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment) (referring specifically to Kennedy's discussion of whether states had consented to 
suits against state officers for prospective relief to vindicate federal law, and assertion 
that Supremacy Clause interests are satisfied by either state or federal court action). 
73. Id. at 2045 (O'Connor, J. concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
Justice O'Connor is quite clearly correct that prior case law did not rely on the unavail-
ability of a state court forum as a basis for invoking Ex Parte Young. It is worth recalling 
that in Ex parte Young itself, Justice Harlan's dissent from the Court's ruling in favor of 
federal jurisdiction over the action against the state Attorney General argued that there 
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opinion further disagreed with Kennedy's suggestion that federal 
courts must evaluate the importance of the federal right at stake 
(rather than whether the relief sought is prospective or retro-
spective) before allowing the suit to proceed.74 And, she argued, 
the lone citation to Chilicky in Seminole Tribe "by no means es-
tablishes that a case-by-case balancing approach to the Young 
doctrine is appropriate. "75 Further disagreement with the ap-
proach advocated by Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice 
Rehnquist was expressed by the four dissenting justices.76 
A majority of the Court thus rejected Justice Kennedy's ef-
fort drastically to revise the Ex parte Young doctrine. Three of 
the five justices in the majority in both Seminole Tribe and 
Coeur d'Alene were unprepared to endorse grand shifts in the 
articulated doctrine, beyond Seminole Tribe's rule that "where 
Congress prescribes a detailed remedial scheme for enforcement 
of a statutory right, a court should not lift the Eleventh Amend-
ment bar to apply its 'full remedial powers' in a suit against an 
officer in a manner inconsistent with the legislative scheme."77 
But a devotee of what Richard Fallon has called the "Na-
tionalist" vision of the federal courts should not be entirely tran-
quil about the implications of Coeur d'Alene.78 For the second 
time in two Terms, prospective (or arguably prospective) relief 
against individual state officers, based on federal law, has been 
found barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The five members 
of the majority seemed willing to interpret Ex parte Young nar-
rowly in order to promote "Eleventh Amendment" interests in 
was a state court proceeding for mandamus (initiated by the Attorney General and 
leading to the contempt finding) in which the constitutionality of the state law could have 
been adjudicated. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 174-83 (Harlan,. J. dissenting); see Coeur 
d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2056-57 (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing availability of state court 
forum in cases relied on in Young); see also Poindexter v. Greenhaw, 114 U.S. 270,288-93 
(1885) (in action initiated in state court, precursor to Ex parte Young doctrine invoked to 
justify availability of relief against state officer notwithstanding state sovereign immu-
nity). Poindexter was, somewhat mysteriously, cited by Justice Kennedy in Coeur 
d'Alene, 117 S. a. at 2035. For further disagreement with Justice Kennedy on this point, 
see id. at 2057-59 (Souter, J. dissenting) (arguing that state courts are obligated, under 
General Oil v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211, 226-27 (1908), to provide a forum "in every case in 
which Ex pane Young supports the exercise of federal-question jurisdiction against a 
state officer," so that availability of a state court forum would count against Ex parte 
Young in every case). 
74. Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. a. at 2047 (O'Connor, J. concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment). 
75. ld. at 2047 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
76. Id. at 2048, 2054-57 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
77. Id. at 2047 (quoting Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1132-33) (O'Connor, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
78. Fallon, 74 Va. L. Rev. 1141 (cited in note 3). 
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restricting federal question jurisdiction. In a portion of Justice 
Kennedy's opinion that was for the Court, he reasoned that 
to permit a federal court-action to proceed in every case 
where prospective declaratory and injunctive relief is sought 
against an officer, ... would be to adhere to an empty for-
malism and to undermine the principle, reaffirmed . . . in 
Seminole Tribe, that Eleventh Amendment immunity repre-
sents a real limitation on a federal court's federal-question ju-
risdiction. 79 
Accordingly, the opinion of the Court continued, "( a]pplica-
tion of the Young exception must reflect a proper understanding 
of its role in our federal system and respect for state courts in-
stead of a reflexive reliance on an obvious fiction."80 How much 
this "obvious fiction" is to be narrowed, either in application or 
through shifts in doctrine (e.g., what counts as "retroactive" re-
lief), must await future developments.81 
II. THE MARSHALL AND REHNQUIST COURTS' 
VISIONS OF FEDERAL COURTS IN VINDICATING THE 
SUPREMACY OF FEDERAL LAW AGAINST THE 
STATES 
Having described and briefly analyzed the logic of the ar-
guments and decision in Coeur d' Alene, let me now step back 
and consider the prior two Terms' Eleventh Amendment deci-
sions in a longer perspective. For I want briefly to compare this 
Chief Justice's vision of the role of the federal courts in vindi-
cating the supremacy of federallaw,82 with that of Chief Justice 
Marshall's court. 
79. Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. a. at 2034 (emphasis added). 
80. Id.; see also id. at 2043 (in closing, the opinion for the Court states that the 
"dignity and status of its statehood allows Idaho to rely on its Eleventh Amendment im-
munity and to insist upon responding to these claims in its own courts, which are open to 
hear and determine the case."). Although Justice O'Connor joined in these portions of 
the opinion, the references to the state courts seem strongly in tension with her separate 
opinion disavowing both the relevance of state fora in the development of the Young 
doctrine and the desirability of changing the Young doctrine. See notes 58, 73. This 
augurs for caution in reading these passages too broadly. 
81. For subsequent discussions, see California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 118 S. a. 
1464, 1472 (1998) and Breard v. Greene, 118 S. a. 1352, 1356 (1998); see also notes 2, 50, 
and 55. 
82. I will take as this Chief Justice's vision the opinion for the Court in Seminole 
Tribe, which he wrote, and those portions of Justice Kennedy's opinion in Coeur d'Alene 
in which Chief Justice Rehnquist (and no others) joined. 
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In Marbury v. Madison,83 one of the important questions 
addressed by the Court was whether the Secretary of State could 
be the subject of a writ of mandamus. Notwithstanding the sov-
ereign immunity of the United States,84 Marshall had no trouble 
in concluding that when an executive officer "is directed by law 
to do a certain act affecting the absolute rights of individuals," 
then the "courts of the country" have a "duty of giving judgment 
that right be done to an injured individual. "85 Speaking implic-
itly about the relationship between the possible sovereign im-
munity of a government office, and the amenability of a gov-
ernment's officers to being restrained, Marshall wrote: 
If one of the heads of departments commits any illegal act, 
under color of his office, by which an individual sustains an 
injury, it cannot be pretended that his office alone exempts 
him from being sued in the ordinary mode of proceeding, and 
being compelled to obey the judgment of the law.86 
It is well known that the Marshall Court did not in fact issue 
the mandamus.87 But if we listen to what Marshall says, and not 
what he does, the vision that is held up is one of public account-
ability to law, through an order issued to an executive branch 
person to do what the law requires. 
Now let us consider Osborn v. Bank of United States .88 In 
addition to asserting a very broad understanding of the constitu-
tional scope of arising under jurisdiction, Chief Justice Marshall 
was confronted with an argument that the jurisdiction of the fed-
eral courts was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Osborn in-
volved an action by officers of the Bank of the United States to 
prevent Ohio from collecting a state tax on the bank which, un-
der the Supremacy Clause preemption principle of McCulloch v. 
83. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
84. At the time of this decision, the sovereign immunity of the United States had 
been discussed by the Court on at least one occasion, in terms suggesting that the United 
States itself could not be sued without its consent. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 
Dall.}419 (1793). Sovereign immunity for the United States and for the States has devel-
oped in tandem, with cases in one line frequently referring to or relying on cases in the 
other. See Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State 
Sovereign Immunity, 98 Yale L.J. I, 77 (1988). 
85. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 171. 
86. Id. at 170. 
87. Whether in an act of judicial statesmanship, see Robert G. McCloskey, The 
American Supreme Court 40-41 (U. of Chicago Press, 1960), power grabbing of a sort in 
establishing judicial review, sheer judicial prudence in not issuing an order that might be 
disobeyed, or some combination, we need not address. 
88. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). 
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Maryland,89 was not constitutionally valid. Acting on behalf of 
the state, an agent of the state physically seized money from the 
Bank of the United States and took it to the state treasury. Ad-
mitting the direct interest of the state, the Court stated that, if 
the state could be made a party it should, but since it could not, 
the action would proceed against the officers, and the Amend-
ment deemed to apply only when the state was a party of rec-
ord.90 Far from considering the possible availability of a state 
court action as a basis for invoking an Eleventh Amendment bar 
to the suit against the state officers, Marshall asserted broadly 
the jurisdiction of the federal courts when a federal question was 
presented in an action against a state officer.91 
Finally, let us recall Justice Sto~'s opinion for the Marshall 
Court in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee. In discussing the jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court to review state court judgments, Jus-
tice Story articulated several elements of what Professor Fallon 
has called the "Nationalist" vision. Rejecting the argument that 
actions in the state courts would be sufficient to vindicate the 
supremacy of federal law, he wrote: 
The constitution has presumed . . . that state attachments, 
state prejudices, state jealousies, and state interests, might 
sometimes obstruct, or control, or be supposed to obstruct or 
control, the regular administration of justice. Hence in con-
troversies between states; between citizens of different 
states ... it enables the parties, under the authority of con-
gress, to have the controversies heard, tried, and determined 
before the national tribunals .... In respect to the other enu-
merated cases-the cases arising under the constitution, laws 
and treaties of the United States ... -reasons of a higher and 
more extensive nature, touching the safety, peace, and sover-
eignty of the nation, might well justify a grant of exclusive ju-
89. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
90. Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 845-48. Note that the jurisdictional provision on 
which the Court relied authorized the Bank to sue or be sued in any state court, or any 
federal court. Id. at 817. Can one imagine telling the Bank of the United States it would 
need to go to state court in Ohio to obtain an injunction against the state's highest offi-
cers? Under Justice Kennedy's approach in Coeur d'Alene, however, this might have 
been the appropriate disposition. 
91. While I recognize that Chief Justice Marshall himself did not always apply the 
party of record rule, see Governor of Georgia v. Madrazzo, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 110 (1828), it 
is worth noting Marshall's effort there to limit and distinguish the case by finding no 
claim of federal law violation. Id. at 124. See also Ex pane Madrazzo, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 
627 (1833) (apparently involving no federal claim). 
92. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
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risdiction [to the national tribunals]. "93 
Thus, Justice Story argued, both the local biases of the 
states, and the greater capacity of the federal tribunals to protect 
the "safety, peace, and sovereignty of the n~tion" required that 
the federal courts be able to hear such cases. 
We thus see very different visions-of law (and its relation-
ship to judicial remedies),95 of the importance of remedies 
against government officers for wrongs committed in their of-
fice,96 and of the relative roles of the state and federal courts in 
securing the supremacy of federal law.97 Much of our present 
93. Id. at 347. 
94. Id. Interestingly, Justice Johnson, (the first justice appointed by President 
Thomas Jefferson, see Geoffrey Stone et al., Constitutional Law at lxv (Little, Brown and 
Co., 2d ed. 1991)), wrote separately to emphasize his view that process would not run to 
the state courts as such but rather to individual parties, and was thus not inconsistent 
with the dignity of the state courts. In doing so, he wrote: 
[n)o sense of dependence can be felt from the knowledge that the parties, not 
the court, may be summoned before another tribunal. With this view, by means 
of laws, avoiding judgments obtained in the state courts in cases over which 
Congress has constitutionally assumed jurisdiction, and inflicting penalties on 
parties who shall contumaciously persist in infringing the constitutional rights of 
others-under a liberal extension of the writ of injunction and the habell5 cor-
pus ad subjiciendum, ... the full extent of the constitutional revising power 
may be secured to the United States, and the benefits of it to the individual, 
without ever resorting to compulsory or restrictive process upon the state tribu-
nals .... 
Id. at 381-82 (emphasis added). Justice Johnson thus placed weight on the importance of 
injunctive and habeas corpus relief against individuals who "infringe the constitutional 
rights of others," that is presumably, government officials. 
While it is, of course, true that the issue in Martin concerned the appellate jurisdic-
tion of the Court, Story's description of the reasons for the extension of judicial power to 
the party-based heads of jurisdiction, and his suggestion of the even greater importance 
of federal jurisdiction over federal question cases, fairly suggest that Congress ought to 
be able to extend to the lower federal courts jurisdiction over all questions of federal law, 
and would favor a narrow, rather than broad, understanding of Eleventh Amendment 
immunity designed to facilitate suits against state officers to vindicate federal law. 
95. Compare Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (the essence of 
civil liberty requires a judicial remedy for breach of rights) with Seminole Tribe v. Flor-
ida, 116 S. Ct. 1114,1119 (1996) (invalidating the only provision authorizing judicial re-
view of the states' statutory duty to negotiate). 
96. Compare Marbury, 5 U.S. at 165-66 (high cabinet-level office will not be a de-
fense to a judicial order to enforce clear duty) with Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2040 
(noting high state offices held by named defendants as basis for concluding that sover-
eign interests of state were so implicated that jurisdiction could not be sustained). 
97. Compare Manin, 14 U.S. at 343, 347 (rejecting argument that federal govern-
ment cannot act on and bind the states in their corporate capacities, and noting the im-
portance of federal jurisdiction over issues of federal law "touching the safety, peace and 
sovereignty of the nation") with Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2037-38 (Kennedy, J., joined 
by Chief Justice Rehnquist) (arguing that the availability of state court for resolving fed-
eral questions against state officials may render lower federal court jurisdiction unneces-
sary and thus barred by the Eleventh Amendment); cf. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2367 (federal 
government cannot, other than in carrying out constitutionally specified duties, require 
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federal judicial system has been built on the Marshall Court's 
constitutional foundations. The Marshall Court cases are still 
studied, in part because of their insistence on federal judicial 
power to enforce federal law and on public officials' account-
ability to law. 
Yet perhaps we are simply in the swing of an enduring cycle, 
or dialogue, between federalist and nationalist visions. While 
one might wonder whether, had a different Chief Justice been 
appointed in 1801, the strong "rule of law" traditions of U.S. 
constitutionalism would have had their foundations so well-laid,98 
perhaps it is now time in our constitutional development for a 
dose of what Richard Fallon has called the "Federalist," or anti-
nationalist, vision. Perhaps it is only in the founding period, or 
at other particular moments in history, that the constitutional 
system needs the Marshallian vision of federal courts, fully em-
powered to enforce federal law, whether against state or federal 
government agents, when they fail to do that which the law re-
• 99 quues. 
Or perhaps the Court has fallen off track in sustaining the 
design of a constitutional system whose fragility may be ob-
scured by its longevity.100 If there is any kind of case in which 
federal, rather than state courts, would seem to be better suited 
to judicial resolution of a dispute, it would be in a dispute be-
tween a federally protected Indian tribe, and a state, over the ef-
fect of the acts of a president of the United States in conferring 
interests on the tribe.101 Perhaps it is not a coincidence that the 
two cases the Court chose to narrow the availability of relief 
state or local governments other than state courts to administer or execute federal law). 
98. See Jackson, 111 Harv. L. Rev. at 2224-28 (cited in note 26); Richard H. Fallon, 
Jr., "The Rule of Law" As A Concept in Constitutional Discourse, g] Colurn. L. Rev. 1 
(1997). 
99. Perhaps this wholly overstates the importance of the Court, and its decisions, in 
the political development of the judicial power. 
100. For a thoughtful treatment of potentially destabilizing excesses in both "Feder-
alist" and "Nationalist" models and arguing for decisionmaking "between the poles" of 
these models, see Fallon, 74 Va. L. Rev. at 1224-51 (cited in note 3). Moreover, as noted 
earlier, more is going on here than the "parity" debate about whether state courts are 
constitutionally interchangeable with the lower federal courts in the adjudication of fed-
eral claims. A deeper set of disagreements about the nature of law, and the relationship 
of courts to law, of law to the actions of governments, and of federal courts to federal 
law, is at stake. 
101. In Coeur d'Alene, the underlying substantive dispute turned in part on whether 
an Executive Order, issued by the President in 1873, giving the Tribe a beneficial interest 
(subject to the trusteeship of the United States) in the beds and banks of all navigable 
waters within the original boundaries of the Coeur d'Alene Reservation, secured the 
tribe's beneficial interests after the admission of Idaho to the Union in 1890 under the 
"equal footing" doctrine. See Coeur D'Alene, 117 S. a. at 2032. 
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against officers involved affirmative claims by Indian tribes.102 
But whether coincidence or no, the reasoning in these cases af-
fects federal jurisdiction over a range of federal issues. 
Let me return to the puzzle with which I began. The dif-
fering paradigms of Chief Justice Marshall and Chief Justice 
Rehnquist make one wonder what vision will best serve this na-
tion now, as it goes into the 21st century a sophisticated, com-
plex and large world power, built on a system of substantial fed-
eral regulation of many aspects of economic and social life, and 
increasingly tied into obligations under international ~reements 
that may impose constraints and duties on the states.1 Perhaps 
the retrenchment of federal judicial power in these two recent 
decisions, and Coeur d'Alene's insistence on the physically terri-
torial attributes of state sovereignty/04 can be understood, in 
part, as symbolic acts of resistance to political, economic and in-
formational centralization, not only in the United States but in 
the global community of which it is increasingly obviously a part. 
102. For description of the underlying dispute in Coeur d'Alene, see text accompa-
nying notes 33-39. Seminole Tribe involved a dispute between the Seminole Tribe and the 
State of Florida over negotiations concerning gambling on tribal lands under the federal 
Indian Gaming Regulation Act. The Indian Tribes referred to in U.S. Const., Art. 1, § 8, 
do not have the status as constitutional sovereigns that states enjoy; indeed, Indian 
Tribes' continued existence as quasi-autonomous governing bodies poses a threat to the 
"federalist" vision of dual (not triple) sovereignty. Perhaps it is not surprising that the 
unavailability of judicial relief, or federal judicial relief, on serious questions of federal 
law in actions brought by those most immediately affected, emerges in claims by Indian 
tribes, an historically disadvantaged group that also operates largely outside the national 
political process, cf. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism, 54 Colum. 
L. Rev. 543 (1954), and, recently, has been unable affirmatively to invoke the jurisdiction 
of the federal courts to resolve disputes with the state governments that, as permitted by 
the federal government, hold power over them. 
103. For a recent illustration of the degree to which jurisdictional doctrine can affect 
the international position of the United States, see Breard v. Greene, 118 S. Ct. 1352 
(1998). The Court there refused to stay Virginia's execution of a Paraguayan convicted 
of murder, notwithstanding the request of the International Court of Justice, and of 
Paraguay, that a stay be entered to permit full consideration of Paraguay's and Breard's 
pending claims that his conviction was invalid because state authorities had concededly 
failed to advise Breard during the investigation of his right to consult with a representa-
tive from the Paraguayan embassy. After concluding that there was no implied right of 
action for Paraguay under the treaty, the Court noted that the Eleventh Amendment 
"provides a separate reason why Paraguay's suit might not succeed." Id. at 1356. Al-
though Paraguay named the Governor as the defendant, the Court found that the Ex 
parte Young "exception" was not available because, unlike in Milliken v. Bradley, 433 
U.S. 267 (1977), there was "no continuing effect" from a past violation of law. Id. at 
1356. Cf. Hearings at 56 (cited in note 13) (discussing possible implications of the United 
States having recently joined the Berne Convention for whether Congress should act 
clearly to abrogate state immunity from suit for copyright infringements). 
104. 117 S. Ct. at 2041-43 (describing in great detail the historic importance of con-
trol of navigable waters to state sovereignty). 
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Note, though, that neither decision prevents the United 
States government itself from bringing suits against states,105 nor 
limits the power of the Supreme Court to review state court de-
cisions in cases brought in state courts.106 Thus, at another level, 
the decisions can be understood as reinforcing the powers of 
both the United States government's executive branch-by cur-
tailing the powers of individual citizens and groups to sue states 
under Article !-enacted statutes, giving the United States theo-
retical control over what suits to bring-and of the Court itself, 
which may become the only federal court able to interpret cer-
tain federal laws applicable to the states.107 
Ultimately, however, there remains something quite mysti-
fying to me in the Rehnquist Court's eagerness to curtail the ju-
risdiction of federal courts in actions brought by individual fed-
eral claimants against states and their officials. The traditions of 
judicial federalism and constitutionalism have long relied on 
suits against officers to secure the effective enforcement of law, 
and in particular, federal law, against government, and especially 
state government, officials. I cannot help but wonder whether 
the early 19th century vision of the Marshall Court does not 
commend itself more to the world of today than does the vision 
of federal judicial power recently advanced in the Rehnquist 
Court. 
105. See United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140-41 (1965). 
106. See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct at 1141 n.14 (noting that Court can review state 
court decisions in actions brought with consent in state courts). For a thoughtful discus-
sion, see Vazquez, 106 Yale L. J. at 1700-09 (cited in note 20) (suggesting that such lan-
guage could be read to support an "immunity from liability" interpretation of the Elev-
enth Amendment). Under the "immunity from liability" view, states need not consent to 
being sued on federal claims in their own courts. For reasons, some of which Professor 
Vazquez anticipates, id. at 708, discussing inter alia, Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979), 
I would not read the Amendment as providing such an immunity. 
107. See Jackson, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 498-99 & n.20 (cited in note 67). 
